MITCHELL v. DARLEY MAIN COLLIERY CO.

said that a court of equity can go nowhere except it has some specific case, like a plank to walk forth upon. As Judge TULEY remarked in the Bamlin-Davis case: "The law recognises the fact
that the business of the world cannot be carried on without confidential relations existing, and also that man is ' unco' weak and
little to be trusted, and therefo ie declares the person occupying the
fiduciary relation incapacitated, as against his employer to obtain
any interest or advantage by a breacb of the trust relation, or in
the language of one of the judges, ' The wise policy of the law has
therefore put the sting of disability into the temptation as a defensive weapon against the strength of the danger which lies in the
situation.'" (Per TULEY, 0. J., decision in Hamlin v. Davis, not
ADELBERT HAMILTON.
reported.
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MITCHELL v. DARLEY MAIN COLLIERY CO.
The plaintiff was the owner of certain land, and in 1867 and 1868, but not afterwards, the defendants worked a seam of coal lying under and near to the plaintiff's
land, which subsided in consequence of the defendant's excavation. Some cottages
of the plaintiff standing on his land were damaged by the subsidence and were repaired by the defendants. In 1882 a second subsidence of the plaintiff's land
occurred owing to the defendant's workings in 1867 and 1868, and the plaintiff's
cottages were again damaged. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to maintain an
action for the damage done to his cottages in 1882, and that his right to sue was not
barred by the Statute of Limitations.
Nicklin v. Williams, 10 Ex. 259 ; Backhouse v. Bonomi, E., B. & E. 622; 9 H.
.. Cas. 503; WAitehouse v. Fellowes, 10 C. B. (N. S.) 765, discussed; Lamb v.
Walker, 3 Q. B. Div. 289, overruled.
AcTION for damages for injuries done to three cottages and six
perches of land belonging to the plaintiff.
The writ of summons was issued on the 27th of December 1882,
and the action'itself came on for trial before HAWKINS, J., at the

Summer Assizes held at Leeds in August 1883, and the following
facts were admitted or proved :
On or about the 11th of December 1866, the plaintiff, by virtue
of a deed of conveyance bearing date on that day, became the tenant in fee simple of . six perches of land situate at Ward Green, in
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Worsbrough, in the parish of Darfield, Yorkshire. Prior to the
year 1878, six cottages had been erected thereon, and in or about
that year, these six cottages were pulled down, and three cottages
were erected on the site of them. The defendants were the lessees
of a seam of coal about nine feet in thickness under the land upon
which the plaintiff's cottages stood, and under certain adjoining
land; they had worked the seam during the years 1867 and 1868,
but not afterwards. A subsidence owing to the defendants' workings took place in 1868 and continued until 1871, and the plaintiff's six cottages which then stood upon his land were damaged by
that subsidence, and were afterwards repaired by the defendants.
In 1882 a further subsidence, caused either wholly or in part by the
defendant's excavations during 1867 and 1868, occurred, and thereby
damage was done to the plaintiff's land, and to the three cottages thein
standing thereon. The present action was brought to recover compensation for the damage done by the subsidence happening in 1882,
and the defendants, amongst other defences, pleaded that the alleged
causes of action did not arise within six years before the commencement of the action, and that the plaintiff's right to sue was barred
by the Statute of Limitations.
The jury summoned to try the issues of fact having been discharged by consent, the action was reserved for further consideration, and ultimately HAWKIrS, J., directed judgment to be entered
for the defendants. The learned judge was of opinion that Lamb
v. Walker, 3 Q. B. Div. 389, was an authority in point for the
present action, and felt himself bound by the decision of the majority of the Queen's Bench Division in that case.
The plaintiff appealed.

Alfred Wills, Q. B. (.

. Mis, with him), for plaintiff.

John Forbes, Q. 0. (Pain,with him), for defendants.
BRETT, M. R;-In this case the plaintiff has brought an action
against the defendants for an injury to his property arising, as he
alleges, from something done by the defendants on their own property. The plaintiff was the owner of property on the surface, and
the defendants were, and are, the owners of the mines immediately
under or close to the plaintiff's property. In 1868 the defendants
worked out the whole -of one seam of coal, said to have been a
seam of about nine feet in thickness. It would seem that soon
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after that excavation of theirs, and by reason of it, the surface
was interfered with and sank, and in consequence of that sinking
some property of the plaintiff's was damaged. The plaintiff made
a claim in respect of that damage to his property, and it was repaired by the defendants. That seems to me to be precisely the
same as if the plaintiff had brought an action against the defendants
and had recovered damages; the money would have been wanted
in order to enable him to execute the repairs. It is not alleged by
the plaintiff that any further damage was done to any property of
his by the actual subsidence which then took place, that is, soon
after 1868. If the ground bad not moved any more, there would
have been no further injury to his houses. The houses hd been
repaired and there was an end of that. It seems clear to me that,
perhaps in consequence of something that was done by somebody
else, and certainly not in consequence of the defendants having
done anything in the meantime, but having left this excavation as it
was, a subsidence took place: not the same subsidence which had
done the former injury, but a new subsidence; and the plaintiff
alleges-and I think it must be taken to. be so-that this new subsidence has done him some appreciable injury. Accordingly he
brings this action in respect of an appreciable injury, caused by
that new subsidence. The objection taken to him is, that he has
brought this action too late. The argument is that as he has brought
this action more than six years after that first subsidence which gave
him a cause of action, therefore he cannot maintain it, because in
an action brought at the time of the former subsidence he might
have recovered damages prospectively for what has since happened
to him. That is the answer of the defendants. The reply on the
part of the plaintiff is this : the fact of the defendants excavating
their minerals gave him no cause of action; it did him no injury
by itself; they had a right to do it; the mines were their own property, and they had a perfect right to do what they liked with their
own, so long as they did not hurt him. When they excavated the
minerals which were their own property, if they had then and there
taken means to prevent the sinking of the plaintiff's property, he
would have had no cause of action against them; what they did in excavating was perfectly lawful, if they had taken care that in so
using their property, they did not hurt him: but in 1868, orimmediately afterwards, they did something which did give him a cause
of action, that is, they caused his land to subside, and that subsi-
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dence caused by them was his cause of action; they caused that
subsidence by mining, and by not propping so as to prevent the
plaintiff's land subsiding afterwards. That cause of action was settled between them when they repaired his houses; but now they have
done him a new and wholly independent injury; they have caused
his land to subside again. It is true that in this case it is at the
same spot as before, but it might have been a hundred yards off: it
is a new subsidence. They have caused that subsidence by the excavation of the minerals in 1868, and by not having filled up that
excavation before 1882. It is no answer to the plaintiff in respect
of this new subsidence, which is the new injury to him, to tell him
that the causa causan= of that was the same as the cau&a causan
of the old subsidence. That causa eauaans gave to-the plaintiff no
right of action at all in either case; but the two different results
from it have given the plaintiff two causes of action, and although
it is true to say that for the same cause of action, successive actions
for damages cannot be maintained, yet there may be any number of
successive causes of action. That is the whole dispute between the
parties. Therefore we must consider what is the real cause of action.
In Backhouse v. Bonomi, 9 H. L. Cas. 503, it was argued that
the cause of action was the excavation, and that the subsidence was
merely a datnage resulting from the excavation. Upon that argument it was urged on behalf of the defendant that the action was
brought too late, because it was brought more than six years after
the excavation, although it was commenced within six years after
the subsidence. The application of Backhouse v. Bonomi, 9 H. L.
Cas. 503, depends upon a view of the facts, which was raised by a
question proposed to the learnedjudges. That question had nothing
to do with successive subsidences, the consequence of one excavation.
The question put to the judges was, in effect, that if there is only
one subsidence, the result of one excavation, is the Statute of Limitations to run from the time of the excavation or from the time of
the subsidence, the words of the Statute of Limitations being that
an action must be brought within six years after the cause of action
accrued? That raises the question, what, in such a case, is the cause
of action ? If the excavation was the cause of action, it having
been rendered wrongful by the subsequent subsidence, even in
that view the wrongful act was the excavation. But the House of
Lords held that the excavation was not originally a wrongful act,
and because it is not originally a wrongful act, it is not made
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a wrongful act by something happening subsequently. An act
which is right at the time when it is done cannot be turned into a
wrongful act by something that happens subsequently. Therefore,
it was held that the excavation was not the cause of action; it was
only the cause of the cause of action; the cause of action was the
subsidence, and that alone; the defendant had so used his property
as to make the plaintiffs' property subside, and it was the making
their property subside which was the cause of action. Thereupon,
the law lords said, that the statute ran from the time when the cause
of action accrued, and that was the -moment of, the subsidence.
Backhouse v. Bonomi, seems to me not to have decided in direct
terms the question of successive subsidences, although I think that
it follows from Backhouse v. Bonomi. that successive subsidences,
when they are independent subsidences, are independent causes of
action, but as to this latter point Backhouse v. Bonomi, does not
bind us by its authority.
Nicklin v. Williams, 10 Ex. 259, had occurred before Backhoumse
v. Bonomi. I do not think it was necessary in Backhouse Y.
Bonomi, for the House of Lords to determine whether .ciklin v.
Williams, was right. I say again that the logical conclusion from
Backhouse v. Bonomi is to show that Nicklin v. Williams was
wrong; but it is not necessary to overrule it. If Nicklin v. Williams
is right, we ought to give judgment in favor of the defendants,
because that case raised the same point as is raised now. It is true
that the question in that case was raised upon demurrer, but it -wasprecisely the same as that now raised, because there an excavationhad been made and a subsidence had happened. The defence was
that the cause of action in respect of that subsidence had been satisfied. The plaintiffs pleaded as a new assignment, that they were not
suing for that cause of action which had been satisfied, but for a new
and different cause of action, namely, a subsequent subsidence. Itwas
argued for the defendant that the new assignment was bad, for it is
only a new assignment of a damage which was the result of the
former cause of acion. If that had been true, the objection of
the defendant would have been good. The Court of Exchequer
upheld the argument for the defendant, and they decided that the
new assignment was bad. Although they did not so express themselves in terms, I think their judgment must have been based on
the ground that the new assignment was really a claim for more
damages than had been recovered in the first action, and thaf the
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damages claimed were damages for the same cause of action. Therefore the result is that where an excavation has been left which causes
one subsidence, if it is still left and causes another subsidence, then
the second subsidence is a part of the damages of the first cause of
action, and is not itself a new cause of action. But if the subsidence itself is the cause of action, and if the two subsidences are
different and independent subsidences, although the causd causans
of both is the same, it seems to me that there are two different causes
of action, and then the decision in Nicklin v. Williams was wrong.
I have already intimated that in my view the logical conclusion
from Bakhouse v. Bonomi shows distinctly that Nicklin v. Williams was wrong. Therefore, I am of opinion that Nicklin v.
Williams cannot be supported as good law.
Then we come to the case of Whitehouse v. Pellowes, 10 C. B.
(N. S.) 765. That was not a mining case, but it seems to me that
". raised precisely the same principle, and the same kind of questioh.
There the trustees of a turnpike road made a covered drain by the
side of the highway. They made it in such a manner that it collected water in it, and that the collected water was caused to flow
into the plaintiff's mines. The drain had been so built that it did
not allow the water to go elsewhere than into the plaintiff's property.
The trustees relied upon a statutory defence that they had made the
drain more than three months before action; but it appeared that
the plaintiff had sustained damage within three months. What is
the difference between the two cases ? In the one case an excavation
is made in the earth by an owner in his property, the result of
which is that his neighbor's property subsides. In Whitehouse v.
_Fellowes, supra, a drain was made which the trustees had power
to alter, or to take up; they made it, not in the mine owner's property but in property over which they had a power, and which therefore, as far as the mine owner was concerned was a different property from his ; it injured him and gave him a cause of action; and
they kept the drain without altering it. The Court of Common
Pleas said the causa causans of the injury to the property was
a continuing cause; but that cause alone gave to the mine owner
no cause of action, it was a cause which if thereby any damage was
occasioned to the mine owner's property, would immediately give
him a cause of action; it had given a cause of action some time ago,
but since that the trustees continued it; they might have stopped it.
the continuing causa causans remained, and remained in the power
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of the trustees, and that caused a new injury to the miue owner's
property; that was a new cause of action because it was an injury
to the mine owner's property in each case. It seems to me that the
case of Whitehouse v. .Fellowesis in direct conflict in principle.with
the case of Nicklin v. Williams, and that it is impossible as a matter
of principle to allow both those cases to stand together. Inasmuch as
I have already expressed an opinion that Nicklin v. Williams was
wrongfully decided, I come to the conclusion that Whitehouse v.
Fellowes was rightly decided, and further that Whitehouse v. Pellowes is in accordance with the principles laid down in Backhouse
v. Bonomi.
Then I come to the case of Lamb v. Walker, 3 Q. B. Div. 889,
and, to show how difficult all this is, in the case of Lamb v. Walker, which was decided after the other two cases and after Backhouse v. Bonomi, eminent judges of great learning were in direct
conflict of view, and anything more directly in conflict than the viewj
of the Lord Chief Justice and MANISTY, J., cannot be conceived.

They are just as much in conflict as the case of 'Whitehouse v. ]ellowes is in conflict with .Nicklin v. Williams. We have had these
judgments carefully analyzed before us ; and I think that we must
agree either with the Chief Justice or with MANisTY, J., and if we

agree with one of them we must disagree with the other. I cannot
help thinking that the judgment of the Lord Chief Justice, which he
might have founded entirely upon Backhouse v. Bonomi, examines
the whole subject afresh, and gives the most weighty reasons to show,
that in such a case as this the only cause of action is the subsidence
of the plaintiff's land, and if that subsidence has been brought
about by the defendants-whether or not by the omission of something after commission, that is, without taking precautions against
the consequences of an act of commission by them-each subsidence is a new cause of action. I cannot see myself any
answer to the case put by the Lord Chief Justice, which is this.
Where an excavation has been made, and a subsidence has taken
place, it may be true that for all the effects, both existing and prospective, of that subsidence, the person injured ought to sue at once,
and I incline to think that he ought. It is not necessary to determine that in this case, but I am strongly inclined to think that he
ought. But what is to be done as to a new subsidence ? The mineowner has excavated in his own property; he knows that he has
caused a subsidence to his neighbor's property, and he knows that
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that neighbor is entitled to damages for it ; will he run the risk of
allowing that excavation to continue, the effects of which he may
obviate by immediately putting a wall or propping up his own property ? There is nothing to prevent him; will he allow that to continue or will he not? If he does nothing, he is not counteracting
the effects on his neighbor's property of something which he has
done on his own; he is not counteracting that mischief to his
neighbor by doing something on his own property; and if there is
a new subsidence that will give his neighbor a new cause of action.
The Chief Justice says it is difficult to conceive that the jury,
which is the tribunal that is to give damages for the first subsidence
that is existing, ought to give damages for a prospective new subsidence which the defendant has the option and the right to prevent;
so that, although before the verdict of the first jury is given, or
although at the time that that verdict is given the mine owner is
doing that which will prevent any future damage, nevertheless the
jury in the first action ought to take into consideration the prospective injury which might be thought likely to occur at the time
when the action was brought. That seems to me to be a proposition which, when it is well sifted out and examined, cannot stand,
and therefore, the Chief Justice's reasoning, of itself, and without
reference to Bachiouse v. Bonomi, is conclusive to show that each
subsidence is a fresh cause of action. Besides that, it seems to me
in accordance with what was decided in Backhouse v. Bonomi
and to be the logical result of Backhouse v. Bonomi. Therefore,
with great deference to my Brother MANISTY, I think the judgment
of the Chief Justice is to be preferred. I think that the judgment
of MELLOR, J., in that case was not a judgment of his own mind,
acting independently, but only an inquiry whether he was concluded
by authority, and at that moment and at that time it may be that
the case was. Therefore, I agree with the Lord Chief Justice's
view that each subsidence is a new cause of action, although the
causa causans of each subsidence may be the same.
It may be argued that the causa causans is not the same. The
causa causansof the first is the excavation ; the causa causansof the
second is, as a matter of fact, the excavation unremedied, or the
combination of the excavation and of it remaining unremedied.
Therefore, whilst I am strongly of opinion, although it is not necessary to decide it in this case, that in respect of the same subsidence
the jury ought to take into account, not only the actually existing
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damages caused by that subsidence, but also the prospective damages
which may be the result of that subsidence, yet I think that where
there is a. new and further subsidence, that is a new cause of action.
If that is so, the plaintiff is right in this case, and is entitled to
succeed. The result of our judgment is, that this case will be referred to some arbitrator who will have to determine the amount of
damages caused by this second subsidence. What the measure of
damages is in that inquiry, is not for us now to determine.
BoWEN and FRY, L. JJ., delivered concurring opinions.
That a statute of limitations does not
commence to run until the plaintiff has
a complete and perfect cause of action,
is, of course, elementary law. That a
complete cause of action does not exist
until the plaintiff has sustained some
damage, is equally true; though its application is not always clearly understood, or perhaps correctly made. Lord
HOBART, C. J., long ago, in Waterer v.

Freeman, Hob. 267 a, laid down the rule
thus: "There must be not only a thing
done amiss, but also a damage, either
already fallen upon the party, or else
inevitable."
And long before that it
had been declared in the Year Book of
19 Hen. VI. 44, "If a man forge a
bond in my name, I can have no action,
yet; but if I am sued, I may, for the
wrong and damage, even though I may
avoid the bond by plea."
The difficulty in the application of this
principle is to determine in what cases
damages do arise, or are presumed to
arise, immediately upon the execution
or completion of an act, so as to give an
immediate cause of action, and when
not. And without considering the subject of actions upon contracts, but only
those arising from torts, positive or negative, some light may be gathered from
a few illustrations. The question always
is, was the act done itself, and under all
circumstances, a legal wrong; an inva.
sion of a fixed and absolute right, to
which the law always imputes at least
nominal damages, or was it an act harm-

less in itself, and only a legal injury
when attended or followed by actual injurious consequences to another? If
one commit an assault and battery
upon another, the latter's right of action
is of course at once complete and perfect
at the commission of the offence; some
damage instantly accrues, and no subsequent increase or development of the
injury, however great, or however subsequent in time, so long as it is a consequence of the original tort, can ever
constitute a new cause of action, as was
clearly established in Whitney v. Clarendon, 18 Vt. 258; HodsolU v. Stallerbrass,
3P. &Dav. 203; lAd. &E. 306 ; Gustin v. Jefferson, 15 Iowa 158, and other
cases. Consequently the statute of limitations begins to run from the time of the
assault, and not from the time of its subsequent consequences.
If personal property is wrongfully
taken from the possession of the owner,
his cause of action is complete and perfect at the moment, and he acquires no
new or second cause of action by the fact
of a subsequent injury to or destruction
of the chattel by the wrongdoer; consequently the period of limitations arises
from the original act of taking, and not
from the subsequent destruction: Granger
v. George, 5 B. & C. 149; Clarke v.
Marriott, 9 Gill 331 ; Johnson v. White,
13 Sm. & Marsh. 584.
And if such property is wrongfully
taken from the possession of a lessee or
bailee for a fixed term, his right of ac-
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tion commences immediately. for the act
of taking is, per se, an invasion of his
right of present possession, and no other
proof of damage would be necessary;
but the lessor or bailor would not have
a right of action without proof of actual
damage or injury to the chattel itself;
i. e., his reversionary rights thereto.
Consequently the statute of limitations
would run only from that time.
If a person utters some kind of slanderous words, such as arc slanderous per se,
some damage is presumed at once, and
the cause of action arises, once for all,
upon the utterance ; but if he titters some
other words, such as not slanderous per
se, no cause of action exists until some
special or actual damage has been occasioned to the plaintiff, which may be a
long time subsequent to the speaking:
Swan v. Tappan, 5 Cush. 104; consequently the limitation does not commence until that event.
On similar grounds it has been held,
that in an action by a father for the mere
loss of his daughter's service, caused by
her seduction and subsequent confinement, the limitation begins to run when
the loss of service accrued, and not from
the time of seduction: Hancock v. Wilhoite, 1 Day. (Ky.) 313 ; though as to
an action for the mere seduction, it might
be different.
So, if an officer has been guilty of
negligence in serving or not serving
legal process, committed to him by a
plaintiff, the latter's cause of action does
not arise at the time of the negligence,
but only at the time he sustains actual
perceptible damage as the result of such
negligence ; and, conscquently, his right
is not barred until the statutory period
has elapsed after the occurrence of such
damage. This was elaborately vindicated in The Bank of Hartford Co. v.
Waterman, 26 Conn. 324. See, also,
Williams V. Mostyn, 4 At. & W. 145 ;
Thanck v. Anderson, 5 T. R. 37 ; Commercial Bank v. Ten Eyck, 48 N. Y.
305 ; Roberts v. Read, 16 East 215;
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Gillon v. Boddington, 1 C. & P. 541 ;
If hitehouse v.Fellowes, 10 C. B. N. S.765.
If a party sustains an injury to his
land by the obstruction of a watercourse,
his right of action commences when he
sustains the damage, and not necessarily

when the obstruction is erected ; and
therefore the statute commences from tie
time of the injury: Angell on Lim.
300 ; Union Trust Co. v. Cuppy, 26
Kans. 756.
In other words, if an act, in and of
itself, always gives a cause or right of
action at once and immediately upon its
cominission, then there can be but one
suit for such act, and all damages, prospective as well as existing, must be recovered in the first action or not at all.
No new development of damages, not
suspected or known before, can give a
right .to a second suit. But where an
act is itself innocent, and does not give
a right of action unless coupled with or
followed by actual appreciable damage,
then as two facts must concur in order
to support a suit, there can be no complete cause of action until the second
event happens, and, consequently, the
statute of limitations does not begin to
run until that time.
Therefore, to apply the foregoing suggestions to te facts involved in the
principal case. Every man has aright to
excavate on his own land-that act alone
gives a neighbor no right of action until
his land falls in consequence, and lie
thus sustains actual damage.
If the
party excavating shores up tile neighboring land, and stays its subsidence,
he is not liable. Therefore, it is clear
an action would not lie for such excavation until the first subsidence. But the
more delicate question is, whether, if
there has been one action based on the
first subsidence, a second action can be
maintained for a second subsidence ? or
whether that should have been anticipated in the first suit, and recovered as.
prospective or reasonably to be anticipated damages in the first suit.

